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This Essay considers lawyers’ perspectives on the consequences of one 
of the most controversial Supreme Court decisions of our time—Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission,1 a 5–4 decision overturning limits 
on corporate and union expenditures in federal elections. Drawing on 
confidential interviews with thirty-one lawyers who participated in the case 
as counsel for parties and amici,2 it explores what the lawyers say about how 
the decision has affected the political process. 
Why should we care about the views of these lawyers? As evidence of 
how the Supreme Court’s ruling in Citizens United actually has affected the 
political process, there are good reasons to be cautious. The lawyers may be 
deeply committed to arguments they made in briefs and unwilling to concede 
valid counterarguments. Their commentary may also reflect their ongoing 
efforts to influence the debate. On the other hand, many of these lawyers are 
close observers of how Citizens United has played out on the ground, and 
their reflections offer a useful complement to opinions expressed by 
scholars, politicians, advocacy groups, and ordinary citizens.3 The fact that 
lawyers on both sides largely agree about the short-term consequences of 
 
* Professor and Founding Faculty Member, University of California, Irvine School of Law. I am indebted 
to the lawyers who allowed me to interview them for this research and sacrificed their valuable time to 
help me understand their work and perspectives. I am also grateful to Rick Hasen and Bryant Garth, who 
commented on an earlier draft. 
 1.  558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 2.  I have thus far conducted fifty-two interviews with lawyers who have been active on campaign 
finance regulatory issues since 2006, when John Roberts became Chief Justice. This Essay draws 
primarily from interviews with the thirty-one lawyers who filed briefs on behalf of parties or amici in 
Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). Of those thirty-one lawyers, fifteen filed briefs on the side of the 
Federal Election Commission, and sixteen filed briefs on the side of Citizens United. 
 3.  For some data on those other perspectives, see Albert W. Alschuler et al., Why Limits on 
Contributions to Super PACS Should Survive Citizens United, (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory Working Papers Series, Paper No. 626, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3015462 
[https://perma.cc/ZG6Z-YDRW]. 
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Citizens United also provides some assurance about the reliability of their 
views on that topic. 
These lawyers’ perspectives about the consequences of Citizens United 
may also be worth considering for reasons having nothing to do with their 
accuracy or truthfulness. Lawyers’ ideas and rhetoric play an important part 
in constitutional interpretation and constitutional change in the United 
States.4 Even if Supreme Court Justices are the ultimate arbiters of 
constitutional questions that come before the Court, they nevertheless rely 
on lawyers to supply arguments to explain, support, and defend their 
decisions.5 Lawyers are also part of the “audience” for judicial decision-
making—those whose approval the Justices care about and who hold them 
accountable.6 Lawyers’ selection of frames sometimes influence judicial 
outcomes7 and shape perceptions in other important arenas of contest over 
constitutional interpretation, including the media and popular opinion.8 Their 
commentary may also reveal something about interests potentially affected 
and about popular attitudes and legal consciousness, since lawyers serve as 
intermediaries, translating laypersons’ claims and perspectives into legal 
language9 and interpreting the Court’s opinions for the public.10 As Jack 
Balkin has suggested, lawyers are influenced by the “larger public culture—
and subcultures—in which [they] live,” and they also shape those 
subcultures.11 In short, lawyers’ commentary on the consequences of 
 
 4.  See generally JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN 
UNJUST WORLD 86–91 (2011). 
 5.  See AMANDA HOLLIS-BRUSKY, IDEAS WITH CONSEQUENCES: THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY AND 
THE CONSERVATIVE COUNTERREVOLUTION 12 (2015); MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC SWEET, ON LAW, 
POLITICS, AND JUDICIALIZATION (2002). 
 6.  See generally LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL 
BEHAVIOR (2006); Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not the 
American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515 (2010). 
 7.  See LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME COURT AND LEGAL CHANGE: 
ABORTION AND THE DEATH PENALTY 307 (1992); GORDON SILVERSTEIN, LAW’S ALLURE: HOW LAW 
SHAPES, CONSTRAINS, SAVES, AND KILLS POLITICS (2009); Justin Wedeking, Supreme Court Litigants 
and Strategic Framing, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 617 (2010). 
 8.  See generally Douglas NeJaime, Constitutional Change, Courts, and Social Movements, 111 
MICH. L. REV. 877 (2013) (reviewing BALKIN, supra note 4) [hereinafter NeJaime, Constitutional 
Change]; Douglas NeJaime, Framing (In)Equality for Same-Sex Couples, 60 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 
184 (2013); Mary Ziegler, Grassroots Originalism: Rethinking the Politics of Judicial Philosophy, 51 U. 
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 201 (2013); Cf. DAVID COLE, ENGINES OF LIBERTY: THE POWER OF CITIZEN 
ACTIVISTS TO MAKE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 225 (2016) (arguing that “framing and messaging are as 
essential to a constitutional campaign as formal legal argument”). 
 9.  NeJaime, Constitutional Change, supra note 8, at 895; BALKIN, supra note 4, at 238. 
 10.  Cf. Jane S. Schacter, Obergefell’s Audiences, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1011, 1028–34 (2016) (noting 
the easy availability of Supreme Court opinions through social media but observing that most readers of 
the opinions are lawyers and that the public’s response is likely shaped by how those lawyers and public 
officials, movement leaders, public intellectuals, and others respond). 
 11.  BALKIN, supra note 4, at 16 (“Lawyers . . . soak up conceptions of what is just and reasonable 
from their society, and from the subcultures they inhabit, as a tree soaks up water through its roots. 
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Citizens United provides a window into how they seek to influence 
constitutional politics through their work, and it may also reveal something 
about how their clients and the constituencies they claim to serve understand 
the issues, even if the direction of influence is unclear. 
This Essay explores a polarized world of advocacy around campaign 
finance regulation.12 Part II briefly summarizes the facts and holding of 
Citizens United and the deeply divided perspectives of the Justices on what 
was at stake in the case. Part III considers the views of lawyers who sided 
with the Federal Election Commission, and Part IV describes the 
perspectives of lawyers on the challengers’ side. Part V highlights the 
primary points of consensus and discord, showing that the lawyers generally 
agree about the direct consequences of Citizens United but strongly disagree 
about the broader implications and what lessons the public should draw. It 
explores the competing frames that lawyers bring to campaign finance 
regulation and fundamental differences in their attitudes about where the 
greatest threats to representative democracy lie. As one lawyer noted, 
“[t]here’s this amazing dichotomy between [the] two worldviews.”13 
I use the term “defenders” throughout this Essay to describe the lawyers 
who championed the legal restrictions invalidated in Citizens United and 
“challengers” to refer to lawyers who urged the Court to strike down these 
limitations on First Amendment grounds. 
II. THE CITIZENS UNITED DECISION 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission involved a 
conservative political action committee’s plan to air on cable television a 
movie that was highly critical of Democratic presidential candidate Hillary 
Clinton. The group had already distributed the film on DVD and in theaters, 
but it wanted to use treasury funds to make it available as a free download to 
 
Conversely, they also influence non-professionals through their work in shaping official law.”); cf. 
ROBERT W. GORDON, TAMING THE PAST: ESSAYS ON LAW IN HISTORY AND HISTORY IN LAW 277–78 
(2017) (noting that “mandarin materials” produced by lawyers and judges “are among the richest artifacts 
of a society’s legal consciousness”; that there are likely to be “trickle-down effects” from elites to other 
elements of society, as well as “refracted trickle-up effects” to lawyers and judges from “a consciousness 
whose primary producers are to the found all over the society”). 
 12.  This Essay does not attempt to capture the lawyers’ views about the process that led to the 
ruling in Citizens United, the breadth of the holding, the quality of the Court’s analysis, and its use of 
precedent. Nor does it consider their perspectives on other major campaign finance decisions of the 
Roberts Court and the jurisprudential legacy on which they build. I will address those questions and others 
in a forthcoming book on the lawyers, organizations and patrons on both sides of campaign finance 
litigation in the Roberts Court and their roles in generating and promoting competing understandings of 
the relationship between the First Amendment and money in politics. 
 13.  Confidential Interview 14. 
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cable subscribers. Section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act14 
(BCRA, also known as McCain–Feingold) prohibited corporations and 
unions from using money from their general treasuries to fund 
“electioneering communications,” defined as “any broadcast, cable, or 
satellite communication” that “refers to a clearly identified candidate for 
Federal office” and is made within sixty days before a general election or 
thirty days before a primary election.15 The United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia ruled that section 203 prevented Citizens United 
from using treasury funds to distribute the movie within thirty days of the 
2008 Democratic primaries. Citizens United still could have paid for the ads 
and distribution through its political action committee, and it could have used 
its general treasury funds for this purpose if it had declined to take money 
from for-profit corporations. 
The Supreme Court heard the case in March 2009 but did not decide the 
case that term. Rather, in a highly unusual move, it called for supplemental 
briefing and a second oral argument early in the following term on whether 
the Court should find section 203 unconstitutional and upset two precedents. 
In January 2010, the Supreme Court invalidated section 203 and held that 
corporations—and, by extension, labor unions—have a First Amendment 
right to spend unlimited amounts independently to support or oppose 
candidates for public office. It found that corporations should not “be treated 
differently under the First Amendment simply because [they] are not ‘natural 
persons.’”16 The Court further determined that campaign expenditures could 
not be regulated for the purpose of limiting access and influence; the only 
basis for restricting corporate expenditure was to prevent quid pro quo 
corruption—a direct exchange of money for political favors, and the Court 
found that the government could not prove that independent expenditures 
could lead to such corruption or the appearance of corruption. The decision 
overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,17 which upheld a 
Michigan statute limiting the amount that corporations could spend to 
support or oppose candidates in elections for state office. It also partially 
overruled McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,18 which upheld the 
very provision of the BCRA that the Court found unconstitutional in Citizens 
United. Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the Court, joined by Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. 
 
 14.  2 U.S.C. § 441b (2002). 
 15.  2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i). 
 16.  558 U.S. 310, 343 (2010).  
 17.  494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
 18.  540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
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Justice Stevens wrote a passionate dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg, 
Breyer, and Sotomayor. Stevens’s dissenting opinion criticized the majority 
for overturning Austin and parts of McConnell when it could instead have 
ruled in Citizens United’s favor on narrower grounds.19 He rejected the 
majority’s claim that corporations hold the same right to spend money in 
elections as natural persons.20 He also took strong issue with the majority’s 
assertion that the only justification for regulating campaign expenditures is 
to avoid quid pro quo corruption.21 He asserted that this “crabbed view of 
corruption”22 “disregards our constitutional history and the fundamental 
demands of a democratic society.”23 
The equation of election spending with speech and the corruption 
rationale for evaluating the constitutionality of campaign finance regulations 
date back to the Supreme Court’s 1976 opinion in Buckley v. Valeo.24 
Buckley upheld contribution limits and disclosure requirements imposed by 
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended in 1974 (FECA), 
but struck down limits on campaign spending. The Court found that political 
contributions and expenditures implicated core political speech25 and that 
 
 19.  The dissenters argued that the Court could have decided that a feature-length film distributed 
through video-on-demand to willing viewers does not qualify as an “electioneering communication” 
under § 203 of BCRA, or that Citizens United was entitled to a media exemption to the spending rules, 
or that § 203 was unconstitutional as applied to Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation that accepted 
only de minimis contributions from for-profit corporations. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 405–08 (Stevens, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 20.  The dissent took strong issue with the Court’s critique of identity-based distinctions: 
 The basic premise underlying the Court’s ruling is its iteration, and constant reiteration, of 
the proposition that the First Amendment bars regulatory distinctions based on a speaker’s 
identity, including its “identity” as a corporation. . . . The conceit that corporations must be 
treated identically to natural persons in the political sphere is not only inaccurate but also 
inadequate to justify the Court’s disposition of this case. 
Id. at 394. 
 21.  Id. at 313. 
 22.  Id. at 447 (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 152). 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 25.  Here is some of the key language from Buckley on the relationship between speech and election 
spending: 
 A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political 
communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting 
the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience 
reached. This is because virtually every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society 
requires the expenditure of money. The distribution of the humblest handbill or leaflet entails 
printing, paper, and circulation costs. Speeches and rallies generally necessitate hiring a hall 
and publicizing the event. The electorate’s increasing dependence on television, radio, and other 
mass media for news and information has made these expensive modes of communication 
indispensable instruments of effective political speech. 
 The expenditure limitations contained in the Act represent substantial rather than merely 
theoretical restraints on the quantity and diversity of political speech. . . .  
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campaign finance regulations were consistent with the First Amendment’s 
free speech and association guarantees only if they could be justified in terms 
of the government’s interest in preventing “corruption” or “the appearance 
of corruption.”26 Without precisely defining those terms,27 it found that the 
interest in preventing the reality and appearance of corruption was a 
constitutionally-sufficient justification for the contribution limit because 
contributions could corrupt politicians, but that it did not justify the 
limitations on independent expenditures, which could not.28 The Buckley 
Court rejected alternative rationales for campaign spending limits based in 
arguments about the government’s interest in promoting political equality.29 
In Citizens United, the majority and dissent painted starkly different 
pictures of the competing stakes. The majority equated campaign spending 
with political speech and asserted that protecting such speech, from whatever 
source, is a foundational principle enshrined in the First Amendment. Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion expressed outrage about section 203’s purposes: 
“[U]nder our law and our tradition it seems stranger than fiction for our 
Government to make . . . political speech a crime. Yet this is the statute’s 
purpose and design.”30 The majority invoked the word “speech” and its 
variations 270 times, twice as often as the dissent, and it used the word “ban” 
forty-two times to characterize the statute’s requirement that any corporate 
expenditures on electioneering must come from PACs rather than general 
treasury funds. 
Justice Stevens’s dissent took strong issue with the majority’s finding 
that corporations must be treated identically to natural persons in the political 
sphere.31 Stevens wrote that the Court’s ruling was “profoundly misguided” 
and “threatens to undermine the integrity of elected institutions across the 
 
 By contrast with a limitation upon expenditures for political expression, a limitation upon 
the amount that any one person or group may contribute to a candidate or political committee 
entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free 
communication. 
Id. at 19–20. 
  In his partial dissent, Justice Byron White rejected the majority’s equation of political spending 
and speech: “[T]he argument that money is speech and that limiting the flow of money to the speaker 
violates the First Amendment proves entirely too much.” Id. at 262 (White, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 26.  Id. at 26–27 (majority opinion). 
 27.  Id. at 27–28 (“[L]aws making criminal the giving and taking of bribes deal with only the most 
blatant and specific attempts of those with money to influence governmental action.”). 
 28.  Id. at 26, 45. 
 29.  Id. at 48–49 (concluding that the idea that the government “may restrict the speech of some 
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First 
Amendment”). 
 30.  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010) (majority opinion). 
 31.  Id. at 394 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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Nation.”32 His opinion also complained about the majority’s emphasis on the 
specter of government suppression of dissent: “Pervading the Court’s 
analysis is the ominous image of a ‘categorical ba[n]’ on corporate speech. 
Indeed, the majority invokes the specter of a ‘ban’ on nearly every page of 
its opinion. This characterization is highly misleading . . . .”33 
In his book on campaign finance and the Constitution, Robert Post 
characterized the strong disagreements between the majority and dissent in 
Citizens United as a “horrifying disjunction.”34 He observed that the two 
sides “seemed to inhabit entirely different constitutional universes,” 
reflecting “a country divided, not united.”35 My research suggests that 
lawyers active on campaign finance issues, like the Justices they seek to 
persuade, inhabit different constitutional universes. As they battle to shape 
the law and public policy through the courts, legislatures, and agencies, and 
as they compete to shape public opinion through the media, these lawyers 
project radically different visions of the First Amendment and its 
relationship to money in politics. 
III. THE DEFENDERS’ VIEWS  
The fifteen defenders whose views I summarize here were 
overwhelmingly, though not exclusively, Democrats who attended elite law 
schools and worked in major metropolitan areas, mostly in D.C. and the 
 
 32.  Id. at 394, 396. 
 33.  Id. at 415 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
 34.  ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION 4 
(2014). 
 35.  Id. The ideological divide among the Justices on campaign finance regulation is not new. 
Writing about Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), Robert Mutch noted “the 
‘unbridgeable ideological gulf’ between the majority and dissenting opinions.” ROBERT E. MUTCH, 
BUYING THE VOTE: A HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 160 (2014). In 2007, Lillian BeVier, a 
strong opponent of campaign finance regulation, wrote: 
 There is little hope for reconciliation of the competing views of the current majority and 
the dissenters. Their disagreement is far more fundamental than a simple dispute about 
doctrine. . . . The problem . . . is that the justices do not reason from the same premises, either 
as a matter of First Amendment principle or as a matter of the empirical assumptions that drive 
their respective analyses. They assess the worth of political freedom differently. They entertain 
wildly divergent assessments of the need for legislation to ‘‘promote democracy.’’ And they 
hold entirely disparate views about either the possibility that legislation can actually effectuate 
genuine improvement or the reliability of the elected officeholders who claim to have acted as 
guardians of the interests of those who seek to have them voted out of office. . . .  
 . . . Compromise on such matters is not in the cards. 
Lillian R. BeVier, First Amendment Basics Redux: Buckley v. Valeo to FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 
2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 77, 112–13. 
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Northeast. In these respects, the defenders’ characteristics reflect those of the 
larger category of all lawyers who filed briefs on the FEC’s side in the case.36 
Not all of the defenders were particularly troubled that the plaintiff, 
Citizens United, prevailed; several noted that they would not have been 
shocked or particularly concerned if the Court had ruled in Citizens United’s 
favor on narrower grounds. But they all disapproved of the holding’s 
breadth, the Court’s finding that commercial corporations have the same 
First Amendment rights as ordinary individuals to spend on elections, and 
the opinion’s narrow definition of corruption. 
Defenders decried the Supreme Court’s “activism” in finding section 
203 of the BCRA unconstitutional and overruling Austin and parts of 
McConnell. One defender grumbled that “[t]he Supreme Court majority won 
the case that they brought . . . and the process of this case was awful. We 
were not allowed to build any kind of record.”37 Another said of the Court’s 
dismantling of key features of existing campaign finance law in Citizens 
United: “They did it, in my view, in a completely sort of lawless way, 
untethered to the precedent and untethered to the facts.”38 
Defenders also uniformly rejected the idea that commercial 
corporations should hold the same rights to political expression as individual 
persons. This comment was typical: 
I think that government can appropriately . . . limit participation in politics 
to human beings, which would include organizations of human beings that 
I don’t think needs to include entities that are created for economic 
purposes to amass wealth as participants in a market economy. I don’t 
think they need to be privileged with the ability to deploy that as if they 
were flesh and blood people, or even coalitions or sort of membership 
groups of flesh and blood people. I think that the idea that a corporation 
that is organized to be in business is for First Amendment purposes 
indistinguishable from a human being is not correct. And I think one area 
where it’s legitimate to treat them differently is in political participation.39 
Another lawyer reached the same conclusion but more directly anchored his 
argument in the Constitution’s text and history, which, he said, require us to 
recognize “this fundamental divide between living, breathing persons who 
the Declaration tells us were created and given unalienable human rights, 
 
 36.  See Ann Southworth, Elements of the Support Structure for Campaign Finance Litigation in 
the Roberts Court, LAW & SOC. INQ. 1, 18–20 (2017) (finding that eighty-one percent of the fifty-four 
lawyers who filed party or amicus briefs on the FEC’s side in Citizens United worked in D.C. or the 
Northeast, and eighty-seven percent attended law schools ranked in the top twenty by U.S News & World 
Report). 
 37.  Confidential Interview 18. 
 38.  Confidential Interview 22. 
 39.  Confidential Interview 34. 
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and corporations who were created to power the economy but with a 
recognition that they would be subject to regulation to ensure that they didn’t 
abuse their special privileges.”40 
Regarding the definition of corruption used in Citizens United, lawyers 
complained about both process and substance. One strongly denied that the 
definition followed from the cited precedents: “[A]ll the cases between 
Buckley and Citizens United said the same thing. They talked about undue 
influence and access. They didn’t just talk about quid pro quo corruption. 
It’s just a lie. But once you write it once with five votes, there it is, it’s the 
law of the land.”41 Another complained that “the Roberts Court . . . has so 
narrowed and eviscerated the meaning of corruption that it almost no longer 
provides any platform to stand on in terms of justifying regulation of money 
in politics. And that narrow corruption frame, in my view, doesn’t speak to 
the deepest values that we need to talk about in defending the regulation of 
money in politics.”42 Another defender observed that 
[t]he corruption rationale, the definition of corruption, prior to Citizens 
United was bad enough and it’s a cramped framework but, at least the 
courts had managed to bend and stretch it to mean so many different 
things. But now that it’s limited to quid pro quo corruption, it’s absurdly 
narrow.43 
One lawyer warned that “we’re really knocking on the door of just turning 
[the definition] into bribery. I think that’s a harmful development.”44 
The defenders generally conceded that Citizens United has not 
unleashed a wave of massive for-profit corporate spending in elections, as 
some of the decision’s critics had predicted at the time of the decision.45 One 
defender acknowledged that the consequences have been less momentous 
than expected: 
 
 40.  Confidential Interview 7. 
 41.  Confidential Interview 22. 
 42.  Confidential Interview 23. 
 43.  Confidential Interview 47. 
 44.  Confidential Interview 4. 
 45.  See, e.g., Editorial, The Court’s Blow to Democracy, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/opinion/22fri1.html [http://perma.cc/MY99-SW4U] (“With a 
single, disastrous 5-to-4 ruling, the Supreme Court has thrust politics back to the robber-baron era of the 
19th century. Disingenuously waving the flag of the First Amendment, the court’s conservative majority 
has paved the way for corporations to use their vast treasuries to overwhelm elections and intimidate 
elected officials into doing their bidding.”); Editorial, Corporate Money in Politics, WASH. POST (May 
9, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/05/08/AR2010050803134_pf.html [https://perma.cc/6FQM-C4WB] (“The 
Supreme Court’s ruling in the Citizens United campaign finance case opened a dangerous pathway for 
corporations to spend money in direct support of—or in opposition to—candidates for federal office.”). 
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Are we down to the political process that was essentially dominated by 
unlimited corporate spending? That’s not actually what happened. You’re 
not seeing . . . . And I’m not saying it never will happen. . . But you’re not 
seeing Mobil Oil or JP Morgan or Pepsi Cola or whatever suddenly 
pumping vast amounts of money into independent expenditures to 
influence the outcome of elections. . . So I think, in that sense, it may be, 
in the short term at least, not knowing what’s going to happen next, less 
significant than people thought.46 
Another defender asserted that while “you don't see business corporations 
doing a tremendous amount of political spending in their own names” 
because they do not perceive that it’s an effective strategy, “there's still a 
direct effect of non-profit corporations that receive large amounts of 
corporate funding, engaging now directly in political speech that would not 
have been permissible prior to Citizen's United.”47 He noted that one of the 
Roberts Court’s previous rulings, Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin 
Right to Life, Inc.,48 had already found that BCRA’s limitations on corporate 
electioneering were unconstitutional as applied to issue advocacy—that they 
were permissible only as to “express advocacy or its functional 
equivalent.”49 But Citizens United eliminated the need to distinguish 
between issue and express advocacy: “So the Chamber of Commerce now 
no longer has to worry about whether its advocacy crosses the line. I mean, 
[Wisconsin Right to Life] had already allowed them to engage in non-express 
advocacy. Now they don't even have to worry.”50 
 Some defenders emphasized that it was never their primary concern that 
business corporations would pour money directly into election campaigns. 
One said: 
We weren’t that concerned that Chevron and Exxon and McDonald’s and 
Wendy’s and Pepsi and Coke were going to jump into elections and spend 
a bunch of money . . . . We didn’t think that would happen because 
generally businesses don’t want their names explicitly associated with 
partisan politics because it alienates huge sections of their consumer 
base.51 
 
 46.  Confidential Interview 12. 
 47.  Confidential Interview 34. 
 48.  551 U.S. 449 (2007). 
 49.  Id. at 465. 
 50.  Confidential Interview 34. 
 51.  Confidential Interview 10. For an example of consumer backlash triggered by a business’s 
political contribution, consider the response to Target’s contribution to a business group that supported 
Republican Tom Emmer’s campaign for Minnesota governor. Emmer was a prominent opponent of same-
sex marriage. See Josh Duboff, Target Issues Apology After Donation to Anti-Gay, Conservative 
Republican, N.Y. MAG. (Aug. 5, 2010, 9:30 PM), 
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2010/08/target_issues_apology_after_do.html 
[https://perma.cc/LZP6-RVHE]. 
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Rather, defenders worried that corporations and their owners would channel 
corporate money into nonprofit groups that do not disclose their donors: 
“What we were concerned about is that 501(c)(4) corporations like the 
plaintiffs, Citizens United, would be free to serve as conduits for business 
community money and evade disclosure, and that’s exactly what has 
unfolded.”52 
Some defenders also predicted that for-profit corporations would 
become increasingly willing to devote substantial amounts of money to 
influence elections in the wake of Citizens United. One said that the 
individual business owners, or business owners coordinating through PACs, 
now handle political spending that serves their business interests: 
“Corporations themselves, I don’t think, have poured a great deal of money 
in. But then they don’t have to. . . It’s the rich guys that own them.”53 But 
this lawyer asserted that corporations would get more directly into the game 
when they concluded that the strategy would benefit them: “There’s a slight 
inhibition now, and the inhibition now is because General Motors doesn’t 
want to sell Democratic cars and Ford doesn’t want to sell Republican 
cars. . . But there will come settings in which the stakes are such that they 
won’t hold back.”54 
Several defenders claimed that one of the worst consequences of 
Citizens United is an indirect one—the large amount of money now 
contributed to “independent-expenditure only committees,” more commonly 
known as Super PACs. In SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election 
Commission,55 the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that limits on 
contributions to Super PACs are unconstitutional; it struck down a federal 
statute that limited such contributions to $5000 per year.56 The court based 
its reasoning on language in Citizens United indicating that corporations 
could make unlimited independent expenditures because independent 
expenditures are not corrupting.57 SpeechNow held that “[i]n light of the 
Court’s holding as a matter of law that independent expenditures do not 
corrupt or create the appearance of . . . corruption, contributions to groups 
that make only independent expenditures also cannot corrupt or create the 
 
 52.  Confidential Interview 10. 
 53.  Confidential Interview 28. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 56.  52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(C) (2016). 
 57.  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010) (“[W]e now conclude that independent 
expenditures . . . do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”). 
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appearance of corruption.”58 Super PACs can now raise unlimited funds 
from individuals, corporations, unions, nonprofits, and other sources. 
In the years since SpeechNow, Super PACs have flourished and 
multiplied. Super PAC spending increased from $609 million in the 2012 
election cycle to $1.06 billion in the 2016 cycle, and the number of Super 
PACs almost doubled in those years from 1265 to 2392.59 In the 2016 
election, liberal Super PACs spent $440 million, and conservative Super 
PACs spent $648.2 million.60 Sixty-eight percent of the $1.6 billion raised 
by Super PACs in the 2016 federal election cycle came from 100 individuals 
and groups.61 Super PAC spending in the 2016 election cycle constituted 
sixty-three percent of all reported spending on federal campaigns.62 
The defenders generally saw the rise of Super PACs as a momentous 
and highly problematic development. One said that “[t]he Super PAC . . . has 
really transformed the political landscape . . . . You just have massive 
infusions of money from sources that are able to give in the hundreds of 
thousands and millions of dollars, concentrated in entities that then expend 
it in unlimited amounts.”63 Another asserted that Super PACs have facilitated 
“the vast increase in the amount of money from the one-tenth of the one 
percent.”64 The defenders acknowledged that most of the money contributed 
thus far to Super PACs has come not from commercial corporations but from 
wealthy individuals, who have long been legally permitted to make unlimited 
independent expenditures in connection with elections under the Buckley 
framework.65 One stressed that “that’s the thing people don’t understand, 
that the money coming from individuals, the big wealthy donors, could come 
before Citizens United and can come now.”66 Another lawyer observed that 
“[w]hat you are seeing is a lot of money that’s attributed to Citizens United 
 
 58.  599 F.3d at 694. 
 59.  Outside Spending, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/fes_summ.php?cycle=2016 [https://perma.cc/WN24-
392Z]. 
 60.  Emily Dalgo & Ashley Balcerzak, Seven Years Later: Blurred Boundaries, More Money, CTR. 
FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS: OPENSECRETS BLOG (Jan. 19, 2017), 
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2017/01/citizens-united-7-years-later/ [https://perma.cc/7KHZ-
T935]. 
 61.  See 2016 Super PACs: How Many Donors Give?, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/donor_stats.php?cycle=2016&type=B 
[https://perma.cc/A7RR-QDKW]. 
 62.  Outside Spending, supra note 59. 
 63.  Confidential Interview 34. 
 64.  Confidential Interview 28. 
 65.  The amounts involved are large: in the 2016 election cycle, 135 donors gave more than $1 
million to outside groups, including Super PACs, “dark money” groups, and other types of outside groups. 
Dalgo & Balcerzak, supra note 60. 
 66.  Confidential Interview 11. 
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but it’s being spent by very wealthy people, typically individuals—
individuals who before this case could have gone ahead and spent that money 
directly anyway.”67 But prior to SpeechNow, wealthy individuals who 
wanted to spend huge sums to influence elections would have been required 
to take personal responsibility for the advertisements that the individuals 
placed (“I am Bob Billionaire, and I approve the message.”)68 
Some defenders noted that the consequences of Citizens United as to 
both corporations and wealthy individuals have been more “psychological” 
than legal. One explained that “[t]he game that you played” before Citizens 
United “was that companies stayed away from express advocacy” or “they 
would fund organizations and you would get these . . . letters of assurance 
that the organization would not do anything that would require them to 
disclose the donors. . . . It’s a concern to this day.” He added, “but I’ve 
noticed a psychological difference, which is prior to Citizens United, had 
they ended up funding express advocacy, they were doing something illegal. 
After Citizens United it was no longer illegal; they’d just be embarrassed.”69 
Another defender described a similar psychological phenomenon with 
respect to wealthy individuals: 
I think the Citizens United opinion unlocked any inhibitions that very 
wealthy people had to work out mechanisms to pour money into the 
campaign. The Super PACs and the vast increase in the amount of money 
from the one-tenth of the one percent, in part, I think, is attributable to the 
Supreme Court—the powerful rhetoric in the Supreme Court.70 
Defenders scorned several factual premises of the majority opinion. In 
particular, they found highly implausible its assumption that, because 
expenditures are legally required to be independent of campaigns, they 
actually are independent. One said that the Court seemed to “have no idea 
that the FEC has gutted all the coordination rules . . . plus the fact the FEC 
doesn’t enforce the laws anyway.”71 Some also criticized Justice Kennedy’s 
assertion that expenditures would be transparent because they would be 
disclosed.72 One lawyer rejected both of those assumptions: 
 
 67.  Confidential Interview 12. 
 68.  See Alschuler et al., supra note 3, at 27–28. 
 69.  Confidential Interview 11. 
 70.  Confidential Interview 28. 
 71.  Confidential Interview 18. 
 72.  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 370–71 (2010) (“With the advent of the Internet, prompt 
disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with the information needed to hold 
corporations and elected officials accountable for their positions and supporters. . . . This transparency 
enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and 
messages”). 
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The Kennedy opinion basically operates as follows. The First Amendment 
protects spending by corporations and that does not pose any threat of 
corruption or the appearance of corruption because of two salient facts. 
One, that by definition the spending is totally independent of a campaign 
so there is no opportunity for corruption, and two, because the spending 
will be entirely transparent and subject to complete disclosure . . . . His 
whole worldview is premised on these twin assumptions about the 
spending not being coordinated and the spending being subject to 
disclosure. Neither of those premises are correct in the real 
world. . . . Citizens United leeched pretty quickly from just being a case 
about corporate spending to also kind of a change in the law relating to 
contributions to political committees that engage only in independent 
spending—Super PACs . . . Super PACs . . . quickly mutated into this 
kind of sub-species of individual candidate Super PACs which are as a 
practical matter functioning basically just as a soft money arm of the 
campaign. So, if you look at the relationship between a candidate . . . and 
that candidate’s individual candidate Super PAC, nobody in their right 
mind would describe that as an independent operation that poses no threat 
of corruption when a donor gives a $10 million contribution to the Super 
PAC and essentially there’s no wall between the donor, the Super PAC, 
and the candidate. It’s all one integrated operation. So that premise of the 
Kennedy opinion as it has been implemented through the growth of 
individual candidate Super PACs . . . is just ludicrous.73 
Another lawyer made a similar argument about what the lawyer viewed as 
the majority’s failure to anticipate the likely ramifications: 
The Court didn’t know what the hell they were doing. . . . Now they knew 
what they were doing in saying “[w]e don’t like restrictions, period.” But 
they didn’t know what the implications were. They didn’t know they were 
going to wind up with Super PACs and unlimited contributions flooding 
the system and nonprofit groups spending hundreds of millions of dollars 
in secret contributions.74 
A third defender stated that “the Roberts Court is very unrealistic about 
politics, intentionally unrealistic. I don’t think they’re naïve; I think they’re 
just ignoring what’s going on.”75 
Many of the defenders asserted that the combination of the narrowed 
definition of corruption adopted in Citizens United, the Court’s general 
skepticism about campaign finance regulation, and the FEC’s lack of 
enforcement of existing regulations, has resulted in an almost complete 
breakdown of campaign finance regulation. These responses were typical: 
[T]he experiment we’re running today, which is largely result of Citizens 
United and the kind of implementation of the vision of the five 
 
 73.  Confidential Interview 6. 
 74.  Confidential Interview 18. 
 75.  Confidential Interview 11. 
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conservative justices, is an experiment in basically a completely 
deregulated campaign finance system. There are still rules on the books. 
There are still contribution limits on the books. There are still disclosure 
rules on the books, which the Roberts Court purports to uphold and 
support. . . . But, as a practical matter in the real world, if you look at the 
2016 campaign, what you see is a world in which there are no contribution 
limits. And as a practical matter, it’s so easy for individuals and candidates 
to get around disclosure rules that anybody who’s interested in avoiding 
the disclosure rules can do so. So as a practical matter, we’re living in a 
world without contribution limits and disclosure rules.76 
[Citizens United] has led all these other things to start to tumble 
down. . . . [I]t was kind of a signal to the world and to the lower courts to 
not take these laws very seriously and to start thinking about ways to get 
rid of them. A lot of what you’ve seen is people just ignoring them, in 
terms of setting up these Super PACs and using them basically as 
campaign arms. . . . Because nobody thinks any of these laws are 
constitutional anymore and so they don’t pay [attention to them] . . . . And 
the FEC has gotten itself into a position where it doesn’t enforce anything 
because the Republicans have gotten into the position of absolutism on 
these laws, all of it encouraged indirectly by Citizens United. So they don’t 
think any of these laws should be enforced and then they won’t let any of 
these laws be enforced, and so the whole thing has kind of unraveled. And 
it’s going to continue to unravel, I think.77 
Another lawyer said that Citizens United “open[ed] the door for the 
destruction of the campaign finance regime that the Court had upheld for 
decades.”78 
The larger consequences of the deregulation of campaign finance, 
defenders say, is increased inequality in the political process and a grave 
threat to the future of American democracy. Their comments on the 
consequences of Citizens United are filled with references to the need to 
protect the integrity of elections and political equality against the outsized 
influence of wealthy individuals and commercial corporations. Their words 
evoke images of physical power, intimidation, coercion, and control by those 
who would harm vulnerable democratic processes: 
I think this is a world that’s largely dominated by the smallest segment of 
the richest people in the country who have the ability to stand up a 
presidential candidate or congressional candidate, and just on the power 
of money take that candidate very, very far down the road, and certainly 
bend candidates to their will in terms of policy positions and positions on 
issues. You look at the spectacle of candidates. . . the Republican 
 
 76.  Confidential Interview 6. 
 77.  Confidential Interview 21. 
 78.  Confidential Interview 18. 
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candidates, traipsing to Las Vegas and kind of bending the knee to 
Sheldon Adelson, and you have to ask questions about whether this is 
really the way our government should work, or politics should work, or 
democracy should work. And whether the kinds of extreme, increasingly 
extreme forms of inequality that characterize society generally, and 
characterize sort of the economic sphere, should leech over to such an 
extreme extent into the political sphere.79 
It’s hard to doubt all the ways in which Citizens United has kind of 
undermined our democracy by allowing corporations and the wealthy to 
spend huge amounts of money to help elect candidates to do their 
bidding.80 
The ramifications of [Citizens United] are huge. . . You have millionaires 
and billionaires playing a dominant role . . . with unlimited contributions 
to so-called individual candidate Super PACs that are . . . not independent; 
they’re arms of the campaigns. We’ve had hundreds of millions of dollars 
of secret money coming into the campaigns. We have corporate money, 
mostly in the form of money spent by incorporated nonprofits, but that 
was prohibited prior to this decision. . . . [Citizens United] basically says 
that democracy has no capacity to protect itself from corruption when 
you’re dealing with the right of people to spend money.81 
In McConnell, the Court upheld a system that, while not perfect, went a 
long way towards limiting the ability of wealthy individuals and 
corporations to essentially control the process. And in Citizens 
United, . . . the Court completely undermined that whole system of 
regulating money in politics.82 
The Roberts Court [is] giving us the Anatole France First Amendment, 
which means that the First Amendment in its majestic impartiality allows 
gigantic corporations and ordinary citizens alike to spend as much as they 
want electing their preferred candidates to office. And that’s the vision of 
equality and of the First Amendment that we’re left with. It is a completely 
sterile and formalistic view of rights and how they play out in our 
democracy, and it leaves people who don’t have money, don’t have 
immense aggregations of wealth that they can spend on politics . . . with 
less of a voice, and it leaves us with a system where . . . the strength of 
your voice depends on the size of your wallet. That’s not what democracy 
is supposed to look like.83 
Pick up any newspaper on any day this year. . . . And you’ll see an article 
about the problems that Citizens United has [along with other campaign 
 
 79.  Confidential Interview 6. 
 80.  Confidential Interview 7. 
 81.  Confidential Interview 18. 
 82.  Confidential Interview 22. 
 83.  Confidential Interview 23. 
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finance decisions by the Roberts Court] caused. My own view is that 
money in politics, big money in big politics, creates an inherent, 
inescapable risk of corruption, properly defined as including influence and 
access, a definition the Court rejected or abandoned. And I think it’s 
important because I think the net result nationally is that there’s less 
speech going on in the country as voters get turned off, and potential voters 
get turned off and saddened and disgusted by the apparent fact that the 
candidates, virtually all of them, are dependent on a small handful of very 
wealthy people to fund their campaign and to help them develop, or push 
them into the positions they take. I think that has potentially dire 
consequences for participatory democracy.84 
The defenders generally agreed that Citizens United has been highly 
consequential in terms of the public’s reaction. One called it “an interesting 
case because of the resonance in popular culture of the decision.”85 Another 
called the political effect of the decision “enormous” because “it’s become a 
talking point in an age of inequality”: 
It is a rallying cry. So to the extent that people have criticisms of the 
Roberts [C]ourt or to the bias of our governing institutions at a time where 
you have this massive disparity in wealth and growing disparity and 
diminishing middle class, both purchasing power and prospects, you have 
Citizens United as an example of a country that has built-in protections for 
privilege. And this is the Supreme Court’s contribution. Congress makes 
its own contribution, right? Wall Street makes its contribution. But this is 
the Supreme Court’s contribution to advancing the political position of the 
well-to-do at a time when the relative position of the well-to-do to the rest 
of the country and the tilt of public policy toward the well-to-do is such a 
central topic in our political debate.86 
Another asserted that Citizens United has led people of diverse political 
perspectives to take notice of an issue they had not previously considered: 
People have heard of Citizens United and they do not like it. I think that 
there are large numbers of people from across the political spectrum who 
are becoming aware that we have a political system that is not functioning 
effectively. And they may have different views about what it would mean 
for it to function effectively and different views about things like guns and 
abortion. But I don’t think that very many members of the public think 
that what the system really needs is larger infusions of corporate cash.87 
 Some defenders also worried about the pervasive public cynicism they 
believed had resulted from campaign finance deregulation. One lawyer, for 
example, observed that campaign finance abuses revealed during Watergate 
 
 84.  Confidential Interview 26. 
 85.  Confidential Interview 10. 
 86.  Confidential Interview 12. 
 87.  Confidential Interview 34. 
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“had the country set its hair on fire in the early ‘70s” but “are just 
commonplace now” and that the country had become “inured” to such 
abuses: 
On the one hand, I think people are still very, very upset about it, but 
there's a kind of sense of hopelessness about being able to do 
anything . . . . We’re at this moment where things that just outraged the 
public following Watergate now are just being met with a sense of futility 
and, I think, somewhat with a sense of despair.88 
IV. THE CHALLENGERS’ VIEWS  
Like the defenders, the sixteen challengers worked in a variety of 
practice settings. But they were more diverse than the defenders in terms of 
the constituencies they claimed to represent, the law schools they attended, 
and the location of their offices. In these respects, these lawyers’ 
characteristics mirrored those of the larger pool of lawyers who represented 
parties and amici on the side of Citizens United.89 Some were libertarians, 
some Republican establishment figures, and others business advocates, Tea 
Partiers, and civil libertarians. Most of the challengers described themselves 
as Republicans or Independents, although two were Democrats. The 
lawyers’ particular positions in Citizens United varied with the interests and 
commitments of their clients, but all of them indicated that they believed that 
most campaign finance regulation is unconstitutional. 
When asked about what was at stake in Citizens United, the challengers 
endorsed the Court’s assertion that it was necessary to strike down these 
limitations and precedents to vindicate the First Amendment. Their 
responses included frequent references to the “marketplace of ideas” and 
“free speech”, and they often characterized campaign finance regulations as 
censorship. These comments about the stakes in Citizens United were 
typical: 
[It was] whether the government gets to determine who speaks, how much, 
on what, for how long, very foundational things to the way that our 
government works. [The decision] reaffirmed the importance of free 
speech. You’re going to have more groups that will not be hesitant about 
expressing their views collectively in the public realm.90 
 
 88.  Confidential Interview 6. 
 89.  See Southworth, supra note 36 (finding that lawyers filing briefs on Citizens United’s side were 
more likely than lawyers on the FEC’s side to work in the South or Midwest, and that they were less 
likely than lawyers on the reform side to have attended law schools ranked in the top twenty by U.S. News 
and World Report). 
 90.  Confidential Interview 8. 
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Rather than limiting speech, we should let more speech enter the 
marketplace of ideas.91 
This is an issue of free speech versus government control and ultimately 
censorship.92 
I think it just promotes the freedom of speech. That’s what I think the main 
implications of it are.93 
I don’t think the government has any business telling people what they can 
say, when they can say it, how they can say it, at what times, and in what 
volumes, wearing what color hat, and hopping on which leg . . . . How 
about we just go with free speech?94 
You can’t have free speech and exclude millions of organizations, like the 
ACLU, like the Chamber of Commerce, like the AFL-CIO, like the 
corporations, from the marketplace. . . Citizens United I just think is one 
of the best First Amendment decisions ever written. . . . The First 
Amendment says, almost without exception, what we say is our choice 
and not the government’s choice. And how loud we say it, or how much 
we say it is our choice and not the government’s choice. So I think it’s a 
great decision.95 
I think that it has freed people to be able to . . . organizations like the NRA, 
or other issue organizations, to be able to speak on behalf of their members 
at election time without fear of being sanctioned or fined.96 
[H]aving corporate speech and commercial speech added to the 
marketplace of ideas benefits democracy as a whole.97 
[G]overnment cannot screw with the marketplace of ideas.98 
[The statutory provision invalidated in Citizens United] violates the 
corporations’ First Amendment rights not to be silenced.99 
[I]t simply cannot be forgotten that the government’s position in Citizens 
United was that it could ban a documentary movie about a political 
candidate during an election year.100 
We’ve helped ideas get into the marketplace . . . . That’s a good outcome. 
I don’t care where that money comes from.101 
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[T]o limit money in politics is to simply limit communication or limit 
speech. It’s very simple and very straightforward and very true. And 
there’s simply no refutation of that, that is possible. So, if you’re limiting 
money, you’re limiting speech.102 
Some challengers emphasized, as the defenders generally conceded, 
that the decision has not resulted in massive corporate spending on elections. 
One lawyer stressed that “there’s not been much corporate money, despite 
all the predictions of cataclysm,”103 and another noted that predictions that 
Citizens United would lead to a flood of corporate spending on the 2016 
presidential race were “totally wrong.”104 Like the defenders, many of the 
challengers emphasized that most of the increased spending attributable to 
Citizens United and SpeechNow.org has come from wealthy individuals and 
not from public for-profit corporations: 
The major effect wasn’t felt by . . . Fortune 500 corporations. . . . The 
sorts of entities that people think about when they talk about, “Oh, there’s 
too much corporate money[.]” Because that money hasn’t really increased. 
It’s Super PACs or advocacy groups of the kind like the National 
Federation of Independent Business, or Planned Parenthood, or the 
NRA . . . . Most of the increased spending . . . has been in independent 
advocacy groups and individuals—whether that’s Tom Steyer or Sheldon 
Adelson, or the Koch brothers . . . . There is more independent spending 
now, but it’s not your Microsofts and your Googles and your Exxons and 
the traditional big corporations.105 
Another lawyer observed that despite all the editorials “talking about how 
big corporations were going to rule America,” that has not happened. Rather, 
he said, “[i]t’s the Adelsons” and other very wealthy individuals who “[a]fter 
Citizens United . . . started to spend the money that Buckley v. Valeo 
would’ve allowed them to spend, and which was sometimes spent, but not at 
all as much as is now becoming the norm in American politics.”106 
Several of the challengers decried the increased role of Super PACs and 
other vehicles for independent spending and their tendency to expand the 
influence of extreme and unaccountable elements at the expense of the major 
political parties. But some challengers offered a more positive account of the 
infusion of money into politics since Citizens United and SpeechNow.org, 
calling it evidence of healthy political engagement. One said that it “shows, 
sort of bottled up demand for participation in elections, which has been 
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unleashed,”107 and another claimed that the decisions have “led to increased 
participation.”108 One lawyer approved of how Super PACs enabled fifteen 
Republican candidates to compete for the 2016 Republican presidential 
nomination, “kind of buoying them along independently. . . keeping them 
going with their messages.”109 Another lawyer cited several instances in 
which an injection of Super PAC funding has fueled competition between 
candidates in races that would otherwise have been a lock: “It’s been good 
for competition. It gets new ideas out, which [is] good.”110 
Like some defenders, who argued that the consequences of Citizens 
United have been more “psychological” than legal, some challengers said 
that the primary result of Citizens United has been that it clarified where the 
lines were and emboldened people and organizations to spend money in 
elections: 
As a legal matter, all the ruling did was erase the express advocacy line 
that unions and corporations, both business and non-profit, could not cross 
in their public communications, which was really not, to me, a practically 
meaningful line anyway. One could message effectively towards whatever 
electoral result one wanted without having to explicitly say, “vote for” or 
“vote against.” I actually thought it was an unconstitutional restriction. I 
believe the decision was fundamentally correct. But I think the 
consequence has been more cultural than legal, in that it has relaxed, to 
some degree, strictures that organizations and perhaps individuals put on 
themselves in part because they were afraid there were lines out there.111 
Another lawyer explained that, for decades prior to Citizens United, the FEC 
“was quite experimental in devising legal standards which they would do 
primarily through selective enforcement” and that people and organizations 
subject to these standards tended to settle rather than fight.112 He maintained 
that Citizens United clarified the law and “basically established rules that 
people could follow” and “eliminated a great deal of uncertainty as to what 
the rules were.”113 
As for critics’ complaints about the definition of corruption used in 
Citizens United, challengers defended the Supreme Court’s approach. One 
complained that “the bounds of the term ‘corruption’” prior to Citizens 
United “had gotten scarily out of control—that corruption. . . . Well, it could 
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 111.  Confidential Interview 19. 
 112.  Confidential Interview 16. 
 113.  Id. 
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mean almost anything associated with money in politics.”114 Other 
challengers suggested that any definition that goes beyond quid pro quo 
corruption is inconsistent with representative democracy.115 Several lawyers 
asserted that there is no principled distinction between influence based on 
financial power and influence based on the techniques used by community 
organizers to get out the vote, or the influence wielded by celebrities and the 
mainstream media.116 
Several challengers acknowledged that Citizens United is unpopular but 
chalked that up to the public’s misunderstanding. One insisted that the 
 
 114.  Confidential Interview 20. 
 115.  See, e.g., Confidential Interview 25 (“If you have a government whose main check is the will 
of the people, so to speak, then people are going clamor to influence politics and get government to do 
what they want it to. That’s not a good thing, but in a free society with a representative form of 
government if you call that corruption then you’re saying that the government itself is corrupt in some 
sense, which I actually think is true.”). 
  The view that politicians’ responsiveness to donors is a necessary feature of democracy is 
suggested by the Supreme Court in Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), and again in McCutcheon v. 
FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014), which invalidated overall limits on the total contributions an individual can 
give in an election cycle. In Citizens United, Justice Kennedy wrote: 
Favoritism and influence are not . . . avoidable in representative politics. It is in the nature of 
an elected representative to favor certain policies, and, by necessary corollary, to favor the 
voters and contributors who support those policies. It is well understood that a substantial and 
legitimate reason, if not the only reason, to cast a vote for, or to make a contribution to, one 
candidate over another is that the candidate will respond by producing those political outcomes 
the supporter favors. Democracy is premised on responsiveness. 
558 U.S. at 359 (alteration in original) (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310). In his majority 
opinion for the Court in McCutcheon, Chief Justice Roberts wrote: 
For the past 40 years, our campaign finance jurisprudence has focused on the need to preserve 
authority for the Government to combat corruption, without at the same time compromising the 
political responsiveness at the heart of the democratic process, or allowing the Government to 
favor some participants in that process over others. As Edmund Burke explained in his famous 
speech to the electors of Bristol, a representative owes constituents the exercise of his “mature 
judgment,” but judgment informed by “the strictest union, the closest correspondence, and the 
most unreserved communication with his constituents.” Constituents have the right to support 
candidates who share their views and concerns. Representatives are not to follow constituent 
orders, but can be expected to be cognizant of and responsive to those concerns. Such 
responsiveness is key to the very concept of self-governance through elected officials. 
134 S. Ct. at 1461–62 (citation omitted). 
  Several of the defenders strongly disagreed with this understanding of representative 
government and the meaning of Burke’s speech. One observed: 
It was actually interesting that what they quoted was from Burke about how representatives . . . 
should feel beholden to their supporters. Well, he was talking about voters and constituents. He 
wasn’t talking about donors! But the court conflated all of that and said basically that there’s 
nothing wrong with an office holder feeling beholden to large donors. That’s politics. Well, I 
think that was really dangerous, and that was really significant. 
Confidential Interview 11. 
 116.  Confidential Interviews 37, 43, 44. 
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decision’s consequences have been “overstated,”117 and another said that 
they have been “very different than what the Left would have you 
believe.”118 Another claimed that the decision has “served to sharpen debate 
about campaign finance laws” but “generally at a very simplistic and almost 
cartoonish level. . . . People use [Citizens United] as a shorthand, and they 
don’t even know what they’re using it as a shorthand for.119 Another 
challenger remarked that “most of the on-the-ground criticism . . . on what’s 
happened as a result [of Citizens United] is inaccurate to the point of 
distortion.”120 
V. DIVERGENT PERSPECTIVES ON THE LESSONS OF CITIZENS UNITED 
The lawyers on the two sides do not disagree fundamentally about how 
Citizens United has affected the political process in the short-term. They 
agree that it has not (yet) unleased a huge wave of direct corporate spending 
in elections but that it has channeled more corporate money into nonprofit 
groups, some of which do not disclose their sources. They agree that Citizens 
United led directly to the D.C. Circuit’s momentous ruling in 
SpeechNow.org. They agree that Super PACs have since multiplied and 
grown and that most of the money contributed to Super PACs and other types 
of outside groups has come from wealthy individuals. They also agree that 
the primary short-term consequences of Citizens United have been more 
psychological than legal, in that they have clarified the lines and emboldened 
those who wish to put money in politics to do so without fear of sanction. 
But the lawyers offered very different perspectives on whether Citizens 
United has been good or bad for the political process and what lessons the 
public should learn. The defenders generally said that the Court’s holding 
that commercial corporations possess the same First Amendment rights as 
natural persons to spend money on elections is a dangerous turn and that the 
Court’s narrowing of the corruption rationale had contributed to 
disproportionate political influence by economically powerful institutions 
and individuals. The challengers applauded the decision as a victory for free 
speech and insisted that any adverse fallout from Citizens United was a price 
worth paying to protect the free flow of ideas. 
Disagreement between the defenders and challengers on the larger 
lessons of Citizens United appear to reflect very different attitudes about 
 
 117.  Confidential Interview 19. 
 118.  Confidential Interview 36. 
 119.  Confidential Interview 19. 
 120.  Confidential Interview 31. 
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government and the possibility of fairly regulating money in politics without 
stifling political association and dissent. The defenders envisioned an 
essential and positive role for government in ensuring fair elections and 
political equality. The challengers, on the other hand, were skeptical about 
government in general and especially about whether government can be 
trusted to regulate money in politics. They viewed the regulation of political 
spending as an intrusion on individual liberty. 
Many of the defenders asserted that government has a responsibility to 
ensure that inequalities in the economic sphere do not subvert democratic 
processes. One argued that “it’s the government’s duty to intervene, to try to 
retain some rough sense of political equality in the country. And to the extent 
that money becomes a mechanism by which one person can exercise outsized 
political power, then I think it is appropriate for the government to step 
in.”121 Another said that government “has a role to ensure that our rights as 
Americans are protected in the political process,” so that “when it comes to 
money in politics, that means ensuring that our voices are not drowned out 
by big money interests, that we have a right to equal participation in the 
process, and that we’re not locked out of an exclusionary process that 
determines who shall govern in America.”122 The same lawyer asserted that 
what has happened with the campaign finance system is we have allowed 
those economic inequalities to spill over and dominate our political 
process, so much so that the vast majority of the public believes that our 
system is rigged. . . . And that undermines the faith in our elections but 
also in our government.123 
Many of the challengers suggested that the concern about money in 
politics would disappear if conservatives succeeded in rolling back 
government. One libertarian stressed that “[t]he problem isn’t money in 
politics; the problem is the government has accumulated too much power 
that it doesn’t rightly possess, particularly at the federal level. . . . [If the 
government were much more limited] we wouldn’t have [the] massive 
concern that we have about money in politics.”124 Another acknowledged 
“discomfort” with the amount of money in politics, but pointed out that “the 
conservative response is, ‘[l]ook, if you want money out of politics, get 
government out of our lives. And then, there’s no real impetus for the money 
to be there in the first place.’”125 Another explained that 
 
 121.  Confidential Interview 28. 
 122.  Confidential Interview 49. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Confidential Interview 3. 
 125.  Confidential Interview 14. 
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if access and influence are a problem, they are a problem because of the 
size and scope of government. What we’re concerned about is the 
government is going to hand out favors that it shouldn’t be handing out or 
it’s going to be doling out punishment to people who should not be 
punished.126 
Some challengers were skeptical about whether it’s even possible to 
regulate campaign finance. One said, “[y]ou’re never going to get money out 
of politics.”127 A lawyer who said that he shared some of defenders’ concerns 
about money in politics nevertheless believed that “in the end . . . efforts to 
regulate them do not work.”128 Another challenger claimed that “realistically 
I think that money finds a way whatever the rules are,”129 while another 
referred to this as the “hydraulic” theory of campaign finance130—that “when 
you clamp down on money[ ] in one place, it tends to pop up someplace 
else.”131 A libertarian stated, 
I think we have more political speech now than we ever did, and if the 
billionaires have more to say, what else is new? And if you limit them, 
they’re going to go buy a newspaper, and if you limit that, they’re going 
to fund a cause organization. You know, you can’t stop it without having 
the kind of total control that we usually associate with North Korea or 
places like that.132 
Many challengers claimed that campaign finance regulations invariably 
advantage those writing the rules, typically incumbents, and tend to be used 
cynically for strategic political advantage. One said that  
when you watch what happens at the FEC, you can’t help but recognize 
that the vast majority of complaints have nothing to do with corruption or 
access or anything else. They have to do with “[t]his will hinder my 
opponent in this race.” That’s what these things are primarily used for.133 
Another lawyer noted that the “accommodations and compromises” made as 
part of the process to achieve campaign finance regulation always “jigger[] 
 
 126.  Confidential Interview 37. 
 127.  Confidential Interview 42. 
 128.  Confidential Interview 44. 
 129.  Confidential Interview 35. 
 130.  For the origins of this term, see Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of 
Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1708, 1718 (1999) (arguing that “political money, like 
water, has to go somewhere. It never really disappears into thin air” and calling this the “hydraulic 
principle”); see also McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 224 (2003) (“Money, like water, will always find 
an outlet.”). 
 131.  Confidential Interview 37. 
 132.  Confidential Interview 32. 
 133.  Confidential Interview 44. 
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the system . . . to the perceived benefit or detriment of certain 
participants.”134 
Most of the challengers supported only minimal campaign finance 
regulations, and some favored no regulation at all. One advocate said that he 
supported the goals articulated by defenders, including “fairness, . . . some 
measure of transparency, and . . . integrity,” but that “reform proposals go 
way beyond that.”135 Several challengers asserted that disclosure is all that 
is required to ensure the integrity of the process.136 Even as to disclosure, 
some of the challengers expressed skepticism, because they thought that that 
those drafting and enforcing disclosure rules would use them to punish 
political enemies. One lawyer suggested that some conservatives who had 
previously supported disclosure “now see how it’s being abused and 
potentially abused, in that it’s being used a weapon.”137 Several challengers 
mentioned the Internal Revenue Service scandal involving increased 
scrutiny of tax-exempt status applications from groups with “Tea Party” or 
“Patriot” in their names as evidence that government could not be trusted to 
wield power responsibly.138 
Several of the libertarians and lawyers associated with Tea Party groups 
maintained that government should play no role whatsoever with respect to 
campaign finance. One said that the proper role of government with respect 
to money in politics is “essentially none.”139 Another advocated giving 
 
 134.  Confidential Interview 16. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  See, e.g., Confidential Interview 2 (“Ultimately the voters decide who will be running the 
government, and if they want a government that is corrupt then they’ll vote for that and if they want a 
government that is not corrupt then they’ll vote for that.”); Confidential Interview 39 (“The view I take 
is all the regulations should be removed and all that should be required is public reporting. As long as 
there’s public reporting that’s required then it’s up to the voters to decide. Okay, so you have a candidate 
and he takes money from the tobacco industry or he takes money from the oil industry or he takes money 
from the crypto-Marxist groups or he takes money from foreign countries, alright, so you just report 
it. . . . So, now, it’s up to you. You’re the voter, you decide. This guy is taking money from whoever it is, 
billionaires, industry, labor unions, Marxist groups, so whichever it is. You know where he gets his 
money, it’s up to you to decide. It’s not up to the government to say, ‘[y]ou can’t take money to present 
your views to the public.’”). 
 137.  Confidential Interview 16. 
 138.  See Emily Cochrane, Justice Department Settles with Tea Party Groups After I.R.S. Scrutiny, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/26/us/politics/irs-tea-party-lawsuit-
settlement.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/4ANG-DJLV]. The Inspector General’s report of cases between 
2004 and 2013 found that the IRS had targeted not only conservative groups but also liberal organizations 
whose names included terms such as “Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now 
(ACORN),” “Progressive,” “Green Energy,” “Medical Marijuana,” and “Occupy.” TREASURY 
INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, REF. NO. 2017-10-054, REVIEW OF 
SELECTED CRITERIA USED TO IDENTIFY TAX-EXEMPT APPLICATIONS FOR REVIEW (2017), 
https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2017reports/201710054fr.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MUN-
JLRC]. 
 139.  Confidential Interview 3. 
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campaign contributions the same constitutional protection as expenditures 
and lifting all other campaign finance restrictions: we “should criminalize 
bribery, purchasing of favors, that sort of thing, and that’s it. I don’t think 
political speech should be regulated.”140 One lawyer proudly noted that he is 
so committed to deregulating campaign finance that he filed an amicus brief 
in Bluman v. Federal Election Commission141 to argue that non-citizens who 
are lawfully within the United States should be allowed to spend money or 
make contributions in U.S. elections. 
The language used by the defenders and challengers in interviews 
differed in some easily quantifiable ways. Defenders used “equal” and 
“equality” almost four times as often as challengers and “democracy” six 
times as often. Challengers used variations on “speech” and “speaker” twice 
as often as defenders and “freedom” and “liberty” three times as frequently. 
Differences in the commentary of the defenders and challengers appear 
to reflect not just contrasting policy positions and the conscious 
manipulation of language and precedent, but also variation in underlying 
conceptual metaphors. As George Lakoff and Mark Johnson have shown, 
metaphor is pervasive in everyday language and thought and in the way we 
view and experience the world, although its influence is often invisible to 
us.142 Lakoff has also argued that conservatives and progressives hold 
conflicting and typically unconscious worldviews structured through 
metaphor.143 Conceptual metaphor also pervades legal thought and 
reasoning,144 and it plays an important role in campaign finance 
jurisprudence. The “marketplace of ideas” concept elaborated by Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. in Abrams v. United States145 imagines ideas as 
 
 140.  Confidential Interview 13. 
 141.  565 U.S. 1104 (2012) (mem.). 
 142.  See generally GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980). 
 143.  See generally GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: HOW LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES 
THINK (3d ed. 2016). 
 144.  See, e.g., STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW LIFE, AND MIND, at xiii (2001) 
(explaining that the book’s purpose is to explore the social constructs that “animate thinking and 
decisionmaking among lawyers, judges, and laypersons alike”); MORTON HORWITZ, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 68 (1992) 
(asserting that legal metaphors are the products of “history and usage,” which shape their “deepest 
meanings and applications,” and arguing that “the rise of a natural entity theory of the corporation was a 
major factor in legitimating big business” ); GORDON, supra note 11, at 128 (noting that judicial reasoning 
is “primarily doctrinal, categorical, and analogical”); id. at 261 (observing that “our views [of the past’s 
relationship to the present] are mediated by familiar narrative story-lines that are so deeply entrenched in 
our consciousness that we are often unaware of their rule over our conception of reality. These story-
lines, like other mentalities, have a history filled with ideological purposes, and there always exist—and 
so we always may draw upon—competing stories that impress the same historical experience with 
radically divergent meanings”). 
 145.  250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen men have realized that time has 
upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations 
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commodities that are bought, sold and traded in a competitive market.146 
That frame looms large in the Supreme Court Justices’ disagreements about 
the boundaries of permissible campaign finance regulation.147 Metaphorical 
thinking also underlies Buckley’s holding that spending money to sway an 
election is speech,148 as well as Citizens United’s ruling that corporations 
enjoy the same First Amendment protections as natural persons with respect 
to campaign spending and that singling out corporations for special treatment 
constitutes a type of impermissible discrimination.149 
Commentary by the interviewed lawyers shows both sides using the 
same metaphors. But, while many of the challengers found these metaphors 
dispositive, defenders emphasized their limitations and argued that, even if 
useful, they must be tweaked to make sense of the First Amendment’s 
broader purposes. 
 
of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best 
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . .”). 
 146.  See WINTER, supra note 144, at 18–19, 20, 271–73. 
 147.  See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 354 (2010) (“Austin interferes with the ‘open 
marketplace’ of ideas protected by the First Amendment”) (quoting N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez 
Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208 (2008)); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 279–80 (2006) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“[A] legislative judgment that ‘enough is enough’ should command the greatest possible 
deference from judges interpreting a constitutional provision that, at best, has an indirect relationship to 
activity that affects the quantity—rather than the quality or the content—of repetitive speech in the 
marketplace of ideas.”); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 809–10 (1978) (White, J., 
dissenting) (“Massachusetts could permissibly conclude that not to impose limits upon the political 
activities of corporations would have placed it in a position of departing from neutrality and indirectly 
assisting the propagation of corporate views because of the advantages its laws give to the corporate 
acquisition of funds to finance such activities. Such expenditures may be viewed as seriously threatening 
the role of the First Amendment as a guarantor of a free marketplace of ideas.”); McCutcheon v. FEC, 
134 S. Ct. 1434, 1467 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Speech does not exist in a vacuum. Rather, political 
communication seeks to secure government action. A politically oriented ‘marketplace of ideas’ seeks to 
form a public opinion that can and will influence elected representatives.”). 
 148.  For key language in Buckley suggesting that spending money on elections is protected speech, 
see supra note 25 and accompanying text. The Buckley Court also analogized a political campaign to an 
automobile and election spending to gas in the tank. 424 U.S. 1, 19 n.18 (1976) (“Being free to engage in 
unlimited political expression subject to a ceiling on expenditures is like being free to drive an automobile 
as far and as often as one desires on a single tank of gasoline.”). 
  The argument that election spending is speech gained currency when Justice Potter Stewart 
articulated the now widely used shorthand for the challengers’ position—money is speech—in oral 
argument: “We are talking about speech, money is speech and speech is money, whether it is buying 
television or radio time or newspaper advertising, or even buying pencils and paper and microphones.” 
ROBERT E. MUTCH, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS, AND COURTS: THE MAKING OF FEDERAL CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE LAW 55 (1988). 
 149.  See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 343 (stating that corporations should not “be treated differently 
under the First Amendment simply because [they] are not ‘natural persons’” (quoting Belotti, 435 U.S. at 
776)); id. at 347 (“[T]he First Amendment does not allow political speech restrictions based on the 
speaker’s corporate identity.”). 
  For examples of scholarship discussing of the significance (or insignificance) of the Court’s use 
of the corporate personhood metaphor in Citizens United, see Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional 
Standing of Corporations, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 95 (2014), and Tamara R. Piety, Why Personhood Matters, 
30 CONST. COMMENT. 361 (2015). 
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Defenders focused on the need to regulate markets to ensure their 
integrity and correct for market failure. One observed that the marketplace 
of ideas metaphor as it applies to money in elections is “powerful” but that 
“the question is, like any marketplace, is there no role for regulation within 
that marketplace?”150 Another mused that “[t]here is no real, unregulated 
marketplace of free ideas, right? . . . You’re not gonna compete with folks 
with millions of dollars who buy the instrumentalities to get their opinions 
across if you’re a guy standing on the street corner.”151 Another contended 
that “[l]ike in capitalism, you can’t leave it—the use of money in politics—
unfettered because I think it just leads to real abuses.”152 
The defenders also argued that the First Amendment is about more than 
free speech—that it also protects the conditions necessary for citizens to 
govern themselves in a representative democracy. These comments were 
typical: 
I’ve always thought that the First Amendment serves a larger purpose in 
preserving our democracy than simply guaranteeing free speech for 
everybody. . . I think it also serves, was intended to serve, as a sort of 
fundamental building block of the democratic process. And so I’m not a 
First Amendment absolutist who believes that any government regulation 
of speech even through the proxy of money is necessarily inconsistent 
with the First Amendment values. If, in fact, there’s enough of a 
demonstration that government regulation is needed in order to maintain 
a democratic structure, that certain voices don’t overwhelm other voices 
and don’t discourage participation . . . I think that that can constitute a 
compelling interest to allow the government to regulate . . . in a modest 
way and limited fashion . . . And in particular, I think government can take 
affirmative actions, as long as they’re done on a non-discriminatory basis, 
and without impinging on other people’s freedoms, to encourage people 
to participate in the process, and to level the playing field in a way that 
wouldn’t otherwise exist if we just relied upon pure money as the end-all-
be-all of who could speak and how much.153 
There’s a tendency to apply the First Amendment as a literal statement 
that you take out of context and you give an open-ended pass to anybody 
who’s purportedly speaking. And that’s not necessarily the way that the 
Constitution was designed to work. It was a total document and that 
document is supposed to preserve integrity. And if the speech is out of 
control, and of course calling money speech is a huge step, but if it’s out 
of control, then that’s not consistent with the Constitution taken as a 
whole.154 
 
 150.  Confidential Interview 28. 
 151.  Confidential Interview 48. 
 152.  Confidential Interview 11. 
 153.  Confidential Interview 27. 
 154.  Confidential Interview 33. 
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The Court is just turning the Constitution on its head when it’s saying, 
“[w]ell, it’s only that individual corruption you can get at but a more 
systemic corruption that threatens the system’s dependence on the people 
is beyond review. . . . History shows the majority’s reinterpreting the First 
Amendment and ignoring the really important powers that Congress and 
state legislatures have to root out corruption to ensure electoral 
integrity.155 
The challengers, on the other hand, generally endorsed the equation of 
political spending and speech, and many of them characterized campaign 
finance regulation as censorship. One, for example, warned about the 
dangers of the reasoning that leads defenders to favor regulation: 
Some of the campaign finance reform groups . . . [argue] that the First 
Amendment imposes almost an obligation on the government to limit 
speech so that the speech of the powerful does not drown out the speech 
of the not powerful—in other words, leveling the playing field by lowering 
the volume of debate . . . I find that a very troubling prospect. It’s 
troubling not only because it does limit free and open debate, but it also 
has to vest someone with the authority to determine what level of debate 
we want and that someone who determines the level of debate we want is 
also going to be in a position presumably to determine how much criticism 
people can venture about where that volume has been set.156 
Another said of efforts to regulate access, influence and systemic corruption, 
“[they] pose tremendous dangers . . . to open democratic debate, when 
you’re giving government this power.”157 Another challenger explained that 
his organization’s position in Citizens United was simple: “Look, this is an 
issue of free speech versus government control and ultimately 
censorship.”158 
Several lawyers associated with conservative and libertarian 
organizations claimed that campaign finance regulation reflected a desire by 
liberals, the media, and even some in the Republican establishment, to stifle 
dissent and keep elites in charge. One lawyer described the deregulation of 
campaign finance as a “free market” solution to money in politics and 
contrasted that approach with the “socialist solution,” which is that 
“government must be in our lives and regulate every corner of it and . . . 
prevent people from speaking out about the government and regulation in 
our lives.”159 He chalked up campaign finance restrictions to elites’ disdain 
for conservatives: 
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 158.  Confidential Interview 25. 
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The liberal thinks you’re stupid because you’re not voting the right way 
because if you were, if you were smart, you’d vote for them. And because 
you’re not voting for them, clearly, you’re stupid and you don’t know what 
you’re doing, and we have to prevent you from voting just because you 
saw a TV ad. Clearly, you’re dumb, you’re voting the way of the last TV 
ad you saw. We have to stop this, we have to protect you from these bad 
ideas, so that you vote the right way, which is our way, and so we’re going 
to institute all these protections to make it really hard for you to get bad 
ideas in your head that will keep you from voting with us, which is the 
right way to vote. That’s the liberal model. 
Another lawyer active with libertarian groups said: 
I don’t really understand the arguments against [Citizens United]. I don’t 
understand what they’re afraid of. They’re not getting shouted down . . . 
They’re the ones that have the dominant social positions. And I do have a 
big problem with the state of America’s media, which I don’t think is 
performing their original function. It just tends to be completely party 
controlled—controlled primarily by the Democrat party, in my opinion. 
So for any of these people on the Left to say, “[o]h we’re getting shouted 
down by the billionaires.” You’re not getting shouted down by the 
billionaires; you’re shouting down everyone else!160 
A lawyer associated with Tea Party groups answered my question about the 
government’s proper role with respect to money in politics with “What is 
hard to understand about the first five words of the First Amendment: 
‘Congress shall make no law’? I mean, I don’t think the government should 
have a role. And I think what we’ve seen is an entire regulatory apparatus 
that is bent upon silencing certain voices.”161 
Several defenders expressed frustration that the money-is-speech and 
free market frames have worked so well in mobilizing opposition to 
campaign finance regulation. One said that “framing has been hugely 
important, hugely important.” He argued that “the McCarthy experience” has 
“shaped this generation and the generations after” and has fueled “mistrust 
over any government regulatory power at all, but certainly government 
regulatory power over communication.” That, in turn, “led to a framing of 
this as a white hat/black hat problem, where the speaker always wore the 
white hat and the regulator always wore the black hat.”162 Another lawyer 
bemoaned the challengers’ success in arguing that what’s at stake campaign 
finance regulation is “not just a question of money; it’s a question of our 
ability to criticize, our ability to speak out.”163 Another defender drew a 
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connection between the speech metaphor’s power and defenders’ inability to 
persuade the Republican base that deregulating campaign finance was not in 
their interests. He said that he wished that he could convince them that 
“nobody’s trying to take away your right to stand on a street corner and 
scream, and do all that!” but 
all your screaming and yelling about an issue, or discussing, or debating, 
or going to town hall meetings [will not matter]; the reason that you don’t 
get a real debate is because, frankly, corporate lobbyists generally don’t 
feel the need to go to those meetings because that’s not where the 
decisions are being made.164 
Several defenders lamented the rise and prevalence of the view that 
regulation is generally ineffective and fraught with unintended negative 
consequences and that rent-seeking inevitably corrupts policymaking.165 
One argued that such profound mistrust of government explains how some 
opponents could advocate the complete deregulation of campaign finance; 
“if you allow any regulation of it, it’s going to be abused—it’s going be used 
to suppress speech—and so, nope, you just can’t have any of it.”166 
Defenders acknowledged that they were at a disadvantage in mobilizing 
a simple frame that can withstand constitutional challenge. The keywords 
that arose most frequently in their responses to questions about the issues at 
stake in campaign finance litigation—democracy, equality, voice, and 
integrity—do not add up to a winning legal theory given the Court’s recent 
precedents and current composition. One lawyer said, “[o]ne of the 
fundamental problems that we are facing on the reform side is that, especially 
under the Roberts Court, but also before that, starting with Buckley v. Valeo, 
the Court has essentially ruled out some of the most compelling justifications 
for regulating campaign finance.”167 Another asserted that it is “not simply a 
question of whether the money can corrupt an office holder, it’s a question 
of whether it small c corrupts and undermines the integrity of the political 
system, of the government, and of course it does.”168 Another insisted that 
“we need a new jurisprudence that allows us to voice the goals of political 
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equality and equal voice beyond just the interest in deterring corruption.”169 
Arguing that more could be done within the speech metaphor underlying 
forty years of campaign finance doctrine by emphasizing the importance of 
“voice”, another lawyer said, “[a]nd so, to me, the frames are about voice 
and power, not about clean governance, not about anti-corruption, and less 
about integrity of our democracy.”170 This approach “buys into the speech 
frame a little bit,” but flips it to ask, “but what kind of voice do I have over 
the decisions that affect my life, and should I be drowned out and should that 
be equal?”171 Another suggested that the challenge was even more 
fundamental: 
We really need to reexamine the whole idea that money is speech. People 
like Larry Tribe . . . get[ ] really mad when you say that: “That’s an 
oversimplification, that’s a bumper sticker, that’s not . . . .” But the truth 
is that has been kind of the guiding star for the Supreme Court since 
Buckley—is that money is speech and that that’s the end of the analysis. 
And I think they’ve got to go back to looking at, “[y]es, money can 
facilitate speech, just like loud speakers can facilitate speech or newspaper 
delivery trucks facilitate speech,” but we don’t just say you can’t regulate 
newspaper delivery trucks, because they are speech. That’s kind of what 
we do with money. So I think that’s just totally wrongheaded.172 
Another defender asserted that “Citizens United is just not gonna stand” and 
that when the Court eventually overturns the decision “it’s going to be with 
a broader rationale than came out of the Buckley decision.”173 
Several lawyers observed that activists on opposing sides of this issue 
see the world very differently and tend to talk past each other. One defender 
said that conceptual frames affect not only how people convey ideas to others 
but also “the way that people perceive things” and that “something that I may 
perceive as being a reasonable effort to force somebody to come clean and 
disclose, limit in some manner, the conservatives generally see as big bad 
government coming in and stifling speech. And it’s like everything is really 
viewed through that lens.”174 A challenger explained that issues that “are 
really complicated” “tend to be reduced to slogans and little snippets of 
‘reform’ or ‘freedom’ or ‘liberty.’ All of those values are implicated here, 
but how it’s all implemented and how it operates is complex.”175 A lawyer 
on the challengers’ side who described himself as a rare moderate 
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Republican who believed that “Buckley largely got it right” asserted that 
“[t]he national debate is insipid and stupid on both sides.” He spoke of the 
difficulty of “policing the line between contributions and expenditures” and 
ensuring that campaign finance regulations are “predictable and understood 
and not subject to political gamesmanship” in a “political environment where 
everyone’s just screaming at each other.”176 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Essay shows that lawyers on opposing sides of Citizens United 
bring very different views to questions about money in politics in general 
and to the consequences of the ruling in particular. They largely agree about 
the decision’s direct consequences, but they offer wildly divergent 
conclusions about its lessons. Both sets of lawyers characterize the other 
side’s position as a danger to the future of representative democracy, and 
both sides use populist rhetoric to explain their positions. But they identify 
different sets of conditions as essential for democracy to thrive, and they 
identify different sets of elites as the primary threat. Defenders assert that 
campaign finance regulation is necessary to ensure that citizens hold equal 
political power corresponding with the one person one vote principle, and 
they see those who oppose the restrictions at issue in Citizens United as too 
willing to allow economic inequality to translate into political inequality. 
The challengers characterize themselves as the guardians of liberty and the 
First Amendment, and they regard defenders as apologists for incumbents, 
the liberal media, censorship, and government overreach. Like the divided 
Justices on the Roberts Court, the lawyers profiled in this Essay assert that 
the stakes involved in campaign finance regulation are enormous, but they 
embrace incompatible visions of how the issues should be resolved. Their 
competing visions appear to show not only differences in how the lawyers 
deploy language and frames to advance their clients’ positions but also a 
deep divide between their worldviews, reflecting the contrasting 
perspectives of the polarized elites of which the lawyers (and Justices) are a 
part.177 
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